How do you issue the right number of shares/options to an employee or an advisor?

HM Revenue & Customs at Mevagissey Harbour
HM Revenue & Customs at Mevagissey Harbour (Photo credit: Cross Duck)

Most founders have desire to share their equity with people that helped them along the way, both as a thank you, but also as a motivation tool. However, how to share is always a big question mark for every Founder. The two most frequently asked question is, “How much equity should I assign an advisor?”, which is shortly followed by “How do I know when to issue shares to new employees and how much do I give them?”.

So, let’s take step back and look at why we are doing this in the first place.

Motivating employees and or advisors is a key part of having a productive workforce. One key element to unlock this productivity is by creating a culture of fairness. In his book titled ‘Drive’, Daniel H. Pink talks about how an employee’s productivity can be binary provided that the right results-oriented work environment is created AND they are treated fairly from a compensation point of view. Effectively, if you don’t create a feeling of fairness in terms of compensation, relative to the market, employees will simply not be ‘open’ to be fully motivated as they will feel slighted. It’s a simple concept on paper, harder to implement in practice.

Therefore, the word ‘fairness’ is what’s important here.. how do you define the fairness culture in your startup?

Let’s start with advisors:

Advisors need to commit some time to your company to ‘earn’ their equity. The first thing to do is to define what kind of role this advisor is going to take. Is he going to provide board-level feedback and help or just operational help (marketing, for example). Is she going to meet with you once a week or once a month?

Then, define a time period for this relationship before you review it for extension. As in, Joe, your marketing advisor, will work with you once a week for 9 months, at which point you can review your working relationship to see if he is needed any further or if it is working out.

It’s really quite simple, find someone that can help you, narrowly define expectations you have of each other and for how long, and then find an equity amount that is in line with the market and that makes them happy.

For the USA, the Founder Institute has come up with some guidelines on numbers, and you can read about those here:
http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/22/free-startup-docs-how-much-equity-should-advisors-get/

They also include an agreement you can sign with your advisor to narrowly define the engagement. For the UK, I’ll be linking to one soon… stay tuned.

Onto Employees (which is a bit trickier and I’ll include the topic of valuations as a bonus):

Back to the topic of Fairness… Fairness is defined by having the total compensation of your employee meet his or her expectations as defined by the market. As such, you need to think of your employee’s total compensation (cash + equity) as something that is within the boundaries of the market norm for his or her role. Deviate too much and not only is hiring hard(er), but you will have inherently unmotivated employees. Total compensations at startups usually have low or no salary, so that fairness is established by assigning equity.

So in order to quantify the value of the equity portion of the total compensation of an employee, one important thing to consider is that the total value of the option package issued, is a function of both the total number given, but also the strike price they have. The two go hand in hand.

But before we go any further, a quick definition check on Strike Price:

An option’s strike price is the fixed price assigned to an option for the purchasing of the underlying share (typically ordinary shares) in the company. In effect, you have to pay the [strike price x  the options] you’ve been granted, to exercise your right to buy the underlying shares. Once you’ve ‘exercised’, you own the shares.

Pricing strike prices is a bit of a pain. In the USA, you have to do 409A valuations. More on that from Fred Wilson here:
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2010/11/employee-equity-the-option-strike-price.html

Pricing in the UK is both simpler and more difficult. More difficult because it isn’t as clear as the USA, but simpler, because there is more flexibility.

Here is the exact language from HMRC (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/shareschemes/emi-new-guidance.htm#10):

If EMI options in an unquoted company are granted the company can, if it wishes, agree the market value of the shares with HMRC Shares and Assets Valuation (SAV). To agree a market value with them the company will need to propose a value for the shares and provide background information to support the proposal. It will need to complete form Val 231 for EMI options.
The form outlines the information needed to support the proposed valuation. When it is complete, it should be sent it to HMRC Shares and Assets Valuation (SAV).
If the form is not used or the company does not supply all the information requested, it may be asked to supply the missing information before a valuation can begin. This could delay the agreement of the valuation. When HMRC Shares and Assets Valuation (SAV) receive your completed form, they will tell you within ten working days if they need any further information.
Asking HMRC to agree a valuation is not the same as:

  •    notifying HMRC of the grant of EMI options
  •    or making the annual tax return required for EMIs

This language does give you some flexibility on how you want to value and define your company’s value at the time you are setting the strike price. Book an appointment with someone like
http://www.completeaccountingsolutions.co.uk/ to discuss how you might go about setting this, or with your lawyers. Getting this right is important because if you don’t get it right, it will have serious tax implications for your employees or any other option recipients.

So back to strike pricing and its effect on the value you give to your employees:

If you have a very high strike price, you affect the employee’s total return on an exit. In a simplified equation (that isn’t designed to give you the present value of your options (Black–Scholes), but rather just the mechanics of cashing out), the value of the options will be:

(Share Price at Exit * Options you have) – (Strike Price you have * Options you have) = value to employee in cash at exit

You can see where to match employee 100, who comes in when the company is worth a lot more, with employee 10, who came in early, you’d have to issue employee 100 many more shares to ‘equal’ the same given to Employee 10. Try explaining all that to your hundredth employee and also to your first few, who might feel slighted that someone has more ‘shares’ than they do for the same job function.

Also, here is an interesting point to consider: different exercise prices for fully vested employees will cause them to behave differently. An employee who has 100 shares to buy, but only at $1 each will act differently (buy the shares and be a passive shareholder) vs an employee that has 100 shares at $100 (more likely to make a calculated decision as to whether to exercise (or not) the options upon a departure). Remember, if you set an exercise period after someone leaves the company, the question is, do you want them to keep the shares as a bet (low price) or only keep them if they really believe in the company (high price)? Again, no right answer as you balance between equity you give out.

So how much equity to give them?

After the above exercise, you see the challenge between articulating fairness mathematically, but also in terms of how employees chat between themselves and can sometimes get the wrong impressions based on not having all the facts.

Transparency is very useful in the early stages of a business, but as you grow, you may choose to just share the basic information of your company’s equity buckets, or strata. It’s really up to you and how you want to stratify the different kinds of employee equity issuances, for example: director level, supervisory level, and admin level.

The trick here, is really in how to ‘define’ who is what. I’d say that the important strata are:

  •    Those that set strategic direction overall (typically the founders or CEO)
  •    Those that set functional strategic direction (typically someone like a CFO, or CMO)
  •    Those that set budgets to hit strategic goals (Directors, VPs)
  •    Those that manage people according to budgets (Supervisors, Line Managers)
  •    Those that execute (Developers, Sales people, etc)

Then, you define what’s a fair total comp bucket value for each of these, and then use the math equations to give you the relative values of equity for each strata.

As with most things of this nature, however, there are more than one way to slice the onion.

Fred Wilson’s post below on what to issue each strata is useful as a guide for both an equation to calculate absolute numbers, but also to help understand the different tiers of employees.
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2010/11/employee-equity-how-much.html

And here is Guy Kawasaki’s suggested split (via @brandid):
http://blog.guykawasaki.com/2006/03/nine_questions_.html

Lastly, here is another version of how to divide things ‘fairly’ between everyone (via @gosimpletax): http://www.brightjourney.com/q/forming-new-software-startup-allocate-ownership-fairly

Once you’ve chosen your preferred method, one mistake to avoid is to promise early employees ‘percentages’. Meaning, don’t say, I’ll give you 2%, but rather say, I’m giving you 2,000 shares which represent 2% of our current cap table. The reason is that if you leave it verbally at 2%, you may inadvertently make them believe that at the next round the will continue to have 2%. Don’t assume all employees understand the mechanics of financing rounds and/or dilution.

Another mistake to avoid is not including a vesting period. Without a vesting period, your employees have full access to what you’ve promised them, whether they’ve spent time to ‘earn it’, it is dangerous for the company to not have one. Read here an explanation of why that’s important:  http://www.seedcamp.com/2012/11/seedhack-founders-collaboration-agreement-version-2-0.html

In the end, this is more of an art, and you will get it wrong at least once, and don’t be afraid to experiment, but as long as you have a process, I believe you will have less issues going forward, particularly when the company grows larger, than if you leave things entirely open-ended.

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Additional Notes on Early-Stage Startup Valuation

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In my recent post on how an early-stage investor values a startup, I talk about how market comparables were the closest guide to how early-stage investors value a startup vs. any other methodology. However, I feel like I left one question unaddressed. Namely, why are there valuation discrepancies for comparable companies across the world (more specifically at investment stage rather than exit stage)?

The answer has to do with liquidity of deals, the localized risks for investors, and the supply of investors.

As I mentioned in my last post, there are various factors that can come into how an investor values a startup, but using market comparables from deals done in the USA doesn’t always incorporate all the risks that are prevalent in the specific geography where the company and investor in question operates. Furthermore, the availability of capital in any geography will also affect how an investor gauges his own risk/reward ratio when pricing deals.

I’m going to talk about this point abstractly and without incorporating the argument of the global nature of internet-based businesses (they do have some localization risk still, but less so). So, for example, startup exits for investors in certain developing economies will happen less often than say, in Silicon Valley. This has to do not only with the number of companies coming out of the country, but the universe of potential buyers for these companies in that geography.

This affects that risk an investor takes, as he is less likely to get that 10x that I mentioned in my previous post. Therefore an investor seeks a ‘discount’ to take on a deal in order to have a portfolio of deals where there is the possibility that one will be able to exit in spite of whatever market conditions exist locally. Add to that the fact that the investor may be one of very few investors, and therefore can command this discount more forcefully than if more competition existed (once enough investors exist, market pricing becomes more stable and in parity with other larger markets).

Think of it this way… If you’ve been on tourist holidays to resorts abroad, you’ll have noticed that things that are generally cheap(er) back home are notably more expensive at the resort store. This higher cost is due not only because of the transport cost to the resort, but also the cost of holding them there in inventory without knowing if anyone traveling to the resort will buy them. If the seller doesn’t include a higher premium on these items, he will not break even considering the high scrap-age risk he must take on inventory not-bought, and if there aren’t any other stores around, the store doesn’t have to compete on price either, but can continue to seek profit under the circumstances.

So, the point of this post is only to highlight why in certain parts of the world financing can be more difficult to get, but also why it can be priced differently than equivalent deals elsewhere.

 

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How does an early-stage investor value a startup?

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One of the most frequently asked questions at any startup event or investor panel, is “how do investors value a startup?”. The unfortunate answer to the question is: it depends.
Startup valuation, as frustrating as this may be for anyone looking for a definitive answer, is, in fact, a relative science, and not an exact one.

For those of you that want to cut to the summary of this post (which is somewhat self-evident when you read it) here it is:

The biggest determinant of your startup’s value are the market forces of the industry & sector in which it plays, which include the balance (or imbalance) between demand and supply of money, the recency and size of recent exits, the willingness for an investor to pay a premium to get into a deal, and the level of desperation of the entrepreneur looking for money.

Whilst this statement may capture the bulk of how most early stage startups are valued, I appreciate that it lacks the specificity the reader would like to hear, and thus I will try and explore the details of valuation methods in the remainder of my post with the hopes of shedding some light on how you can try and value your startup.

As any newly minted MBA will tell you, there are many valuation tools & methods out there. They range in purpose for anything from the smallest of firms, all the way to large public companies, and they vary in the amount of assumptions you need to make about a company’s future relative to its past performance in order to get a ‘meaningful’ value for the company. For example, older and public companies are ‘easier’ to value, because there is historical data about them to ‘extrapolate’ their performance into the future. So knowing which ones are the best to use and for what circumstances (and their pitfalls) is just as important as knowing how to use them in the first place.

Some of the valuation methods you may have have heard about include (links temporarily down due to Wikipedia’s position on SOPA and PIPA):

While going into the details of how these methods work is outside of the scope of my post, I’ve added some links that hopefully explain what they are. Rather, let’s start tackling the issue of valuation by investigating what an investor is looking for when valuing a company, and then see which methods provide the best proxy for current value when they make their choices.

A startup company’s value, as I mentioned earlier, is largely dictated by the market forces in the industry in which it operates. Specifically, the current value is dictated by the market forces in play TODAY and TODAY’S perception of what the future will bring.

Effectively this means, on the downside, that if your company is operating in a space where the market for your industry is depressed and the outlook for the future isn’t any good either (regardless of what you are doing), then clearly what an investor is willing to pay for the company’s equity is going to be substantially reduced in spite of whatever successes the company is currently having (or will have) UNLESS the investor is either privy to information about a potential market shift in the future, or is just willing to take the risk that the company will be able to shift the market. I will explore the latter point on what can influence you attaining a better (or worse) valuation in greater detail later. Obviously if your company is in a hot market, the inverse will be the case.

Therefore, when an early stage investor is trying to determine whether to make an investment in a company (and as a result what the appropriate valuation should be), what he basically does is gauge what the likely exit size will be for a company of your type and within the industry in which it plays, and then judges how much equity his fund should have in the company to reach his return on investment goal, relative to the amount of money he put into the company throughout the company’s lifetime.

This may sound quite hard to do, when you don’t know how long it will take the company to exit, how many rounds of cash it will need, and how much equity the founders will let you have in order to meet your goals. However, through the variety of deals that investors hear about and see in seed, series A and onwards, they have a mental picture of what constitutes and ‘average’ size round, and ‘average’ price, and the ‘average’ amount of money your company will do relative to other in the space in which it plays. Effectively, VCs, in addition to having a pulse of what is going on in the market, have financial models which, like any other financial analyst trying to predict the future within the context of a portfolio, have margins of error but also assumptions of what will likely happen to any company they are considering for investment. Based on these assumptions, investors will decide how much equity they effectively need now, knowing that they may have to invest along the way (if they can) so that when your company reaches its point of most likely going to an exit, they will hit their return on investment goal. If they can’t make the numbers work for an investment either relative to what a founder is asking for, or relative to what the markets are telling them via their assumptions, then an investor will either pass, or wait around to see what happens (if they can).

So, the next logical question is, how does an investor size the ‘likely’ maximum value (at exit) of my company in order to do their calculations?

Well, there are several methods, but mainly “instinctual” ones and quantitative ones. The instinctual ones are used more in the early-stage type of deals and as the maturity of the company grows, along with its financial information, quantitative methods are increasingly used. Instinctual ones are not entirely devoid of quantitative analysis, however, it is just that this “method” of valuation is driven mostly by an investor’s sector experience about what the average type of deal is priced at both at entry (when they invest) and at exit. The quantitative methods are not that different, but incorporate more figures (some from the valuation methods outlined) to extrapolate a series of potential exit scenarios for your company. For these types of calculations, the market and transaction comparables method is the favored approach. As I mentioned, it isn’t the intent of this post to show how to do these, but, in summary, comparables tell an investor how other companies in the market are being valued on some basis (be it as a multiple of Revenues or EBITDA, for example, but can be other things like user base, etc) which in turn can be applied to your company as a proxy for your value today. If you want to see what a professionally prepared comps table looks like (totally unrelated sector, but same idea), go here.

Going back to the valuation toolset for one moment… most of the tools on the list I’ve mentioned include a market influence factor , meaning they have a part of the calculation that is determined by how the market(s) are doing, be it the market/industry your company operates in, or the larger S&P 500 stock index (as a proxy of a large pool of companies). This makes it hard, for example to use tools (such as the DCF) that try and use the past performance of a startup (particularly when there is hardly a track record that is highly reliable as an indicator of future performance) as a means by which to extrapolate future performance. This is why comparables, particularly transaction comparables are favored for early stage startups as they are better indicators of what the market is willing to pay for the startups ‘most like’ the one an investor is considering.

But by knowing (within some degree of instinctual or calculated certainty) what the likely exit value of my company will be in the future, how does an investor then decide what my value should be now?

Again, knowing what the exit price will be, or having an idea of what it will be, means that an investor can calculate what their returns will be on any valuation relative to the amount of money they put in, or alternatively what their percentage will be in an exit (money they put in, divided by the post-money valuation of your company = their percentage).  Before we proceed, just a quick glossary:

Pre-Money = the value of your company now
Post-Money = the value of your company after the investor put the money in
Cash on Cash Multiple = the multiple of money returned to an investor on exit divided by the amount they put in throughout the lifetime of the company

So, if an investor knows how much % they own after they put their money in, and they can guess the exit value of your company, they can divide the latter from the former and get a cash-on-cash multiple of what their investment will give them (some investors use IRR values as well of course, but most investors tend to think in terms of cash-on-cash returns because of the nature of how VC funds work). Assume a 10x multiple for cash-on-cash returns is what every investor wants from an early stage venture deal, but of course reality is more complex as different levels of risk (investors are happy with lower returns on lower risk and later stage deals, for example) will have different returns on expectations, but let’s use 10x as an example however, because it is easy, and because I have ten fingers. However, this is still incomplete, because investors know that it is a rare case where they put money in and there is no requirement for a follow-on investment. As such, investors need to incorporate assumptions about how much more money your company will require, and thus how much dilution they will (as well as you) take provided they do (or don’t ) follow their money up to a point (not every investor can follow-on in every round until the very end, as many times they reach a maximum amount of money invested in one company as is allowed by the structure of their fund).

Now, armed with assumptions about the value of your company at exit, how much money it may require along the way, and what the founding team (and their current investors) may be willing to accept in terms of dilution, they will determine a ‘range’ of acceptable valuations that will allow them, to some extent, to meet their returns expectations (or not, in which case they will pass on the investment for ‘economics’ reasons). This method is what I call the ‘top-down’ approach…

Naturally, if there is a ‘top-down’, there must be a ‘bottom-up’ approach, which although is based on the ‘top-down’ assumptions, basically just takes the average entry valuation for companies of a certain type and stage an investor typically sees and values a company relative to that entry average. The reason why I say this is based on the ‘top-down’ is because that entry average used by the bottom-up approach, if you back-track the calculations, is based on a figure that will likely give investors a meaningful return on an exit for the industry in question. Additionally, you wouldn’t, for example, use the bottom-up average from one industry for another as the results would end up being different. This bottom-up approach could yield an investor saying the following to you when offering you a termsheet:

“a company of your stage will probably require x millions to grow for the next 18 months, and therefore based on your current stage, you are worth (money to be raised divided by % ownership the investor wants – money to be raised) the following pre-money”.

One topic that I’m also skipping as part of this discussion, largely because it is a post of its own, is “how much money should I raise?”. I will only say that you will likely have a discussion with your potential investor on this amount when you discuss your business plan or financial model, and if you both agree on it, it will be part of the determinant of your valuation. Clearly a business where an investor agrees that 10m is needed and is willing to put it down right now, is one that has been de-risked to some point and thus will have a valuation that reflects that.

So being that we’ve now established how much the market and industry in which you company plays in can dictate the ultimate value of your company, lets look at what other factors can contribute to an investor asking for a discount in value or an investor being willing to pay a premium over the average entry price for your company’s stage and sector. In summary:

An investor is willing to pay more for your company if:

  • It is in a hot sector:investors that come late into a sector may also be willing to pay more as one sees in public stock markets of later entrants into a hot stock.
  • If your management team is shit hot: serial entrepreneurs can command a better valuation (read my post of what an investor looks for in a management team). A good team gives investors faith that you can execute.
  • You have a functioning product (more for early stage companies)
  • You have traction: nothing shows value like customers telling the investor you have value.

An investor is less likely to pay a premium over the average for your company (or may even pass on the investment) if:

  • It is in a sector that has shown poor performance.
  • It is in a sector that is highly commoditized, with little margins to be made.
  • It is in a sector that has a large set of competitors and with little differentiation between them (picking a winner is hard in this case).
  • Your management team has no track record and/or may be missing key people for you to execute the plan (and you have no one lined up). Take a look at my post on ‘do I need a technical founder?‘.
  • Your product is not working and/or you have no customer validation.
  • You are going to shortly run out of cash

In conclusion, market forces right now greatly affect the value of your company. These market forces are both what similar deals are being priced at (bottom-up) and the amounts of recent exits (top-down) which can affect the value of a company in your specific sector. The best thing you can do to arm yourself with a feeling of what values are in the market before you speak to an investor is by speaking to other startups like yours (effectively making your own mental comparables table) that have raised money and see if they’ll share with you what they were valued and how much they raised when they were at your stage. Also, read the tech news as sometimes they’ll print information which can help you back track into the values. However, all is not lost. As I mentioned, there are factors you can influence to increase the value of your startup, and nothing increases your company’s value more than showing an investor that people out there want your product and are even willing to pay for it.

Hope this helped! Feel free to ask questions in the comments.

UPDATE: I wrote some additional notes on early-stage startup valuation because I felt I didn’t quite cover all parts in the above summary. You can ready those by clicking here.

Other Pieces on the subject

http://www.quora.com/How-do-VC-firms-value-a-start-up
http://www.quora.com/Internet-Startups/How-do-investors-value-a-consumer-internet-start-up
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/72384

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